In cognitive science, there is a tacit norm that phenomena such as cultural variation or synaesthesia are worthy examples of cognitive diversity that contribute to a better understanding of cognition, but that other forms of cognitive diversity (e.g., autism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder/ADHD, and dyslexia) are primarily interesting only as examples of deficit, dysfunction, or impairment. This status quo is dehumanizing and holds back much-needed research. In contrast, the neurodiversity paradigm argues that such experiences are not necessarily deficits but rather (...) are natural reflections of biodiversity. Here, we propose that neurodiversity is an important topic for future research in cognitive science. We discuss why cognitive science has thus far failed to engage with neurodiversity, why this gap presents both ethical and scientific challenges for the field, and, crucially, why cognitive science will produce better theories of human cognition if the field engages with neurodiversity in the same way that it values other forms of cognitive diversity. Doing so will not only empower marginalized researchers but will also present an opportunity for cognitive science to benefit from the unique contributions of neurodivergent researchers and communities. (shrink)

Marc-Wogau, K. Mina filosofiska fördomar.--Gustafsson, L. Om klassifikation.--Kanger, S. Några synpunkter på begreppet inflytande.--Torstendahl, R. Minikrav, optimumnormer och paradigm i historisk vetenskap.--Lagerberg, D. Punktkommentarer till dialektiken.--Nordenfeldt, L. Om olika former av interaktion.--Puterman, Z. An indeterminist interpretation of Marx's historical determinism.--Carls, R. Kunskap och frihet.--Andersson, J. S. Some notions of pragmatic implication.--Tönisson, I. A preliminary study of interpreting K[subscript x]ø¹.--Bergström, L. Vilken handlingsutilitarism är den riktiga?--Alfredsson, T. Kärlekskoefficienter.--Segerberg, K. The assignment problem as a problem of social choice.--Åqvist, L. En tidslogisk variant (...) av Morgenstjärneparadoxen. (shrink)

Preferenslogik, av S. Kanger.--Några synpunkter på olika innehållsrelationer, av T. Pauli.--The number of modalities in the Brouwer system supplemented by the axiom schema CL[superscript n]aL[superscript n+1]a, by K. Segerberg.--Konjunktion av ting, av A. H. D. MacLeod.--Über den "Kettensatz der Verpflichtung;" ein Kommentar zu einem Satz der deontischen Logik, von M. Moritz.--Was the ether hypothesis refuted by the Michelson-Morley experiment? By H. Törnebohm.--Die ewige Wiederkunft; ett filosofihistoriskt tidsfördriv, av A. Wedberg.--Some observations on modal logic and philosophical systems, by G. H. von (...) Wright.--Några kommentarer till två varseblivningsteorier, av L. Åquist. (shrink)

We investigate some logics with Henkin quantifiers. For a given logic L, we consider questions of the form: what is the degree of the set of L–tautologies in a poor vocabulary (monadic or empty)? We prove that the set of tautologies of the logic with all Henkin quantifiers in empty vocabulary L*∅ is of degree 0’. We show that the same holds also for some weaker logics like L ∅(Hω) and L ∅(Eω). We show that each logic of the form (...) L ∅ (k)(Q), with the number of variables restricted to k, is decidable. Nevertheless – following the argument of M. Mostowski from [Mos89] – for each reasonable set theory no concrete algorithm can provably decide L (k) (Q), for some (Q). We improve also some results related to undecidability and expressibility for logics L(H4) and L(F2) of Krynicki and M. Mostowski from [KM92]. (shrink)

Das Sramanyaphala-Sutra. Synoptische Übersetzung und Glossar der chinesischen Fassungen verglichen mit dem Sanskrit und Pali. Konrad Meisig. Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 1987. ix, 625 pp. DM 58.

We present a bimodal logic suitable for formalizing reasoning about points and sets, and also states of the world and views about them. The most natural interpretation of the logic is in subset spaces , and we obtain complete axiomatizations for the sentences which hold in these interpretations. In addition, we axiomatize the validities of the smaller class of topological spaces in a system we call topologic . We also prove decidability for these two systems. Our results on topologic relate (...) early work of McKinsey on topological interpretations of S4 with recent work of Georgatos on topologic. Some of the results of this paper were presented at the 1992 conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge. (shrink)

The article outlines the basic lines of a phenomenology of driving. The starting point is the thesis that “driving” does not occur in nature and is therefore a form of movement reserved for humans, which is linked to the invention of the wheel. This invention expanded the possibilities of mobility in technical and social terms. We argue that, on the one hand, travelling on wheels strengthens individuality and the feeling of freedom, but on the other hand it has a strong (...) socio-political component that is often ignored: Efficient driving requires a dense road network, and this only emerges as the achievement of a community. Referring back to Matthew B. Crawford’s philosophy of driving and Günther Anders’ philosophy of technology, the question of whether the “autonomous car” restricts or expands the freedom of drivers is discussed. Finally, it is shown that the concept of driving, as manifested above all in the automobile, has also had a significant influence on our concept of social progress. However, this concept has fallen into crisis due to the ecological collateral damage of combustion technology. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to examine the nature of moral and legal norms in a broader context: first, taking into account logical and methodological assumptions, second, in the perspective of psychology of emotions and legal policy. The basic subject of the research carried out by Leon Petrażycki was represented by law. Originally, it had a psychological character, not an objective, eternal, and unchanging one. To fully understand the genesis and nature of morality and law, Petrażycki addressed the study (...) of mental phenomena, especially emotional experiences. First, however, he developed appropriate rules of logic and scientific methodology. Then he developed a new classification of mental phenomena, among which the fundamental role is played by bilateral emotions. At some stage, emotions begin to cooperate with cognitive processes, first of all with imaginations. Imaginations of acts, such as theft, betrayal, murder, can cause repulsive emotions, and type imaginations, such as truthfulness, charity, justice can evoke apulsive emotions. On the basis of such associations, judgments are created over time, the content of which becomes a basis for fundamental rules of conduct, that is, for norms. There are two fundamentally different types of norms: moral norms and legal norms. The norms of the first type are imperative and represent the nature of validity, while the norms of the second type are imperative-attributive and they also always entitle someone to something, i.e. they give someone a right. This division determines a fundamental difference between morality and law. (shrink)

The idea of philosophy as a kind of therapy, though by no means standard, has been present in metaphilosophical reflection since antiquity. Diverse versions of it were also discussed and applied by more recent authors such as Wittgenstein, Hadot and Foucault. In order to develop an explicit, general and systematic model of therapeutic philosophy a relatively broad and well-structured account provided by Martha Nussbaum is subjected to analysis. The results obtained, subsequently, form a basis for a new model constructed around (...) the set of notions intrinsically connected with any, philosophical, psychological, or medical, form of therapy. The conceptual framework of: disease and its symptoms, the health ideal, the process of treatment with its techniques, therapeutic theory, physician, patient, and the physician-patient relationship is constructed and investigated in the context of its possible metaphilosophical use. An illustrative application of this scheme to philosophical therapy developed by Stoicism is, then, discussed. Finally, the issue of the therapeutic metaphilosophy's scope as well as the problem of therapeutic philosophy's specificity and integrity are briefly indicated. (shrink)

A historical investigation of the exclusion of Africa and Asia from modern histories of philosophy.

Die Massenmedien tragen Not und Elend aus anderen Teilen der Welt in die Wohnzimmer der wohlsituierten Bewohner der sog. Ersten Welt. Umgekehrt wird den elenden in Fimen, Serien und Informationssendungen der Reichtum der Bessergestellten vorgeführt. Deshalb genügt ein ausschließlich auf familiäre, regionale oder nationale Herkunft abhebendes Verständnis vom "Nächsten" nicht mehr In der weltweiten Mediengesellschaft kann dieser, ursprünglich in der Agrarischen Gesellschaft beheimatete Begriff nur dann zum sozialen Miteinander beitragen, wenn er grundsätzlich auf alle Menschen erweitert wird.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:When Doctors Get It WrongKonrad BlairThe BeginningIt was a gloomy winter day as I sat in the back of the car while my father and mother drove me to another appointment in Pittsburgh. It was and wasn’t like so many car trips of my childhood for so many doctors’ appointments. The same deadening silence filled [End Page 89] the car as we drew closer to our destination. My parents (...) never discussed the appointments with me and I just learned to never ask. This appointment was different though; it came about as a result of request by a psychology professor who was conducting a follow–up study on individuals treated by the team of endocrinologists I saw as a child.The professor had reached out to me through my parents, since that was the only contact information available. It had been more than ten years since I had seen any of the doctors who treated me as a child. I was living in another state when I received the call from my mother informing me of the request for my participation in the study. I was really quite shocked; in all the years I was treated in early childhood and adolescence, no one had ever asked me how I felt about the treatment I received. I knew I had a medical condition, but no one ever explained to me why I needed so many appointments, and why I had to take medicine three times a day. No one told me why, when I was two or three years old, I had surgery that left me with memories of gauze and a catheter between my legs, or why medical residents still wanted to examine me, or why I had to be humiliated and ashamed, again and again. I was in my early 30’s by this time. Surely if my condition was so important that someone wanted to talk to me now, so many years later, the conversation would have already happened?!My parents dropped me off at the scheduled location for the interview. The professor introduced himself and his colleague. I didn’t recognize them, which meant they weren’t the doctors who had treated me. I remember feeling somewhat relieved, as I never liked the doctors who treated me as a child. I remembered my last appointment there, and feeling that I was escaping from captivity, that I was free to go on with my life.I wasn’t sure what to expect from this meeting. The professor told me that to date no one had completed any follow–up on the pediatric patients treated by the hospital’s endocrinology team to see how they were faring in life. He said he thought that was quite odd, so had decided to take on the project himself. He began by asking, “so, D_____, [I went by another name then] how are you doing at this point in your life?”I felt a sudden surge of rage, and, to my own surprise, I found myself responding angrily, “Why the hell do you care? It’s been over ten years and nobody, I mean nobody gives a rat’s ass as to how I’m doing and coping with the ramifications of the treatment I received from Dr. X.” Looking back, more than ten years after this meeting, I can see that I had been angry for a long time. I had been compliant and knew to play my role as a good girl. I had a good job, and I was married, but I knew I was far from happy.And so with that first question began what would be the long painful journey to discovering what had been hidden from me for over half my life, the source of my confusion and unparalleled frustration. What I had experienced throughout my childhood would permeate every aspect of my being and perception of myself for years to come. Every day I had to confront the effects of that experience just to live another day.The MiddleI was in shock and disbelief as I read and reread the letter my attorney presented to me from the very group of... (shrink)

The Values in Action (VIA) classification of character strengths and virtues has been recently proposed by two leading positive psychologists, Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman as “the social science equivalent of virtue ethics.” The very possibility of developing this kind of an “equivalent,” however, is very doubtful in the light of the cogent criticism that has been leveled at modern moral theory by Alasdair MacIntyre as well as the well argued accusations that positive psychology, despite its official normative neutrality, is (...) pervaded by specifically Western individualism and instrumentalism. In order to evaluate whether the VIA project can be considered as substantially rooted in virtue ethical tradition, the classification was assessed against two fundamental features of the classical version of the latter: (1) the substantial interconnectedness of individual virtues, as expressed by the thesis of the unity of virtue, and (2) the constitutive character of the relationship between virtue and happiness. It turned out, in result, that the two above features are not only absent from but also contradicted by the VIA framework with the latter's: (1′) construal of individual virtues and character strengths as independent variables and (2′) official endorsement of the fact/value distinction. As soon as the arguments for the superiority of the classical virtue ethical perspective are provided, the potential responses available to the VIA's proponents are discussed. (shrink)

Proceedings of a conference held Dec. 4-5, 1998 at the Universit'at G'ottingen.

One of the important determinants of development during the transition to adulthood is the undertaking of social roles characteristic of adults, also in the area of finishing formal education, which usually coincides with beginning fulltime employment. In the study discussed in this paper, it has been hypothesized that continuing full-time education above the age of 26, a phenomenon rarely observed in Poland, can be considered as an unpunctual event that may be connected with difficulties in the process of identity formation. (...) Relationships between identity dimensions and identity statuses, and age and educational context were analyzed. 693 individuals aged 19-35 took part in the study. The participants attended three types of educational institutions: full-time university studies, part-time university studies, and full-time post-secondary school. Among the students of full-time university studies predictable dependencies, also in respect of highlevels of indicators of identity crisis and a high frequency of diffused identity occurrence, were observed. Such dependencies were not found in the group of full-time post-secondary school students. (shrink)

This paper argues that institutions are higher-level autonomous systems enacted by patterns of participatory sense-making. Therefore, unlike in the standard equilibrium theory, institutions are not themselves thought of as behavioural patterns. Instead, they are problem domains that these patterns have brought forth. Moreover, these are not merely any patterns, but only those devoted to maintaining a specific strategy of problem solving, called the strategy of ‘letting be’. The latter refers to, following Hanne de Jaegher, a balance between underdetermination and overdetermination (...) of individual behaviour by a collective. Such an understanding of institutions becomes an option once a hybrid ‘equilibrium + rules’ theory of institutions, such as the one proposed by Frank Hindriks, is supplemented with insights from enactivism. In this light, drawing a connection between these two areas is the additional, meta-theoretical goal of this paper. This connection is beneficial, I argue, in particular since it allows for a satisfactory, in-depth account of the normative character of institutions as well as their local character. (shrink)

The practical aspect of ancient philosophy has been recently made a focus of renewed metaphilosophical investigation. After a brief presentation of three accounts of this kind developed by Martha Nussbaum, Pierre Hadot, and Michel Foucault, the model of the therapeutic argument developed by Nussbaum is called into question from the perspectives offered by her French colleagues, who emphasize spiritual exercise (Hadot) or the care of the self (Foucault). The ways in which the account of Nussbaum can be defended are then (...) discussed, including both a ‘negative’ defense, i.e. the indication of the weaknesses of Hadot and Foucault’s proposals, and a ‘positive’ one focused on the points in which Nussbaum can convincingly address doubts about her metaphilosophical account. In response to these analyses, some further remarks made by Hadot and Foucault are discussed in order to demonstrate that their accounts are not as distant from Nussbaum after all. Finally, a recent metaphilosophical study by John Sellars together with a therapeutic (medical) model developed by the author of the present article are suggested as providing a framework for potential reconciliation between all three accounts discussed and a resource for further metaphilosophical studies. (shrink)

We examine second order intuitionistic propositional logic, IPC². Let $F_\exists $ be the set of formulas with no universal quantification. We prove Glivenko's theorem for formulas in $F_\exists $ that is, for φ € $F_\exists $ φ is a classical tautology if and only if ¬¬φ is a tautology of IPC². We show that for each sentence φ € $F_\exists $ (without free variables), φ is a classical tautology if and only if φ is an intuitionistic tautology. As a corollary (...) we obtain a semantic argument that the quantifier V is not definable in IPC² from ⊥, V, ^, →. (shrink)

The conceptual landscape connected with such notions as mental disease, mental disorder, or, considerably broader, madness is not only complex and internally heterogeneous, but also somewhat obscure. Even the very nature of complexity and heterogeneity at place, what is more, seems to be unclear, which is reflected in the numerous (and heated) debates philosophers of psychiatry engage in and, respectively, in the variety of fundamentally incompatible, if not incommensurable, high-level models of psychopathology they develop (Fulford & Colombo, 2004).The paper by (...) Justin Garson (2023) can be understood as a successful attempt at helping us to find our bearings in such a troublesome conceptual domain. As such, it can... Read More. (shrink)